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The Problem with Dobbs and the Rule of Legality
WILLIAM J. ACEVES*
In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court
reversed decades of precedent to overrule Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. In anticipation of the Court’s decision, several states
adopted “trigger laws” restricting abortion. These laws were explicitly
drafted to take effect if Roe and Casey were overturned. These laws joined
pre-Roe “zombie laws” that restricted abortion and were never rescinded by
state legislatures despite Roe and its progeny. Collectively, trigger laws and
zombie laws are now being used in several states to impose restrictions on
reproductive autonomy. This Essay challenges the validity of these laws.
Despite their eponymous names, they are not laws. When the Supreme Court
affirmed the right to abortion in Roe and reaffirmed that right in Casey, any
inconsistent state laws were voided. When states adopted laws contrary to
Roe and Casey in the hope of future reversal, these laws were void ab initio.
Dobbs did not and could not resurrect these laws. Prosecution under trigger
laws or zombie laws would violate the rule of legality—there is no crime in
the absence of a duly enacted law. Until state legislatures adopt de novo
restrictions on reproductive autonomy, courts should reject any effort to rely
on outdated and void legislation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,1 the Supreme Court
reversed decades of precedent to overrule Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.2 Because the right to
abortion does not appear in the Constitution, the Court indicated that it is an
unenumerated right entitled to only rational basis review by the courts.3
Applying this most deferential form of judicial review, the Court held that
Mississippi was free to prohibit abortion because it had offered several
legitimate state interests in justification of the law.4 Written by Justice
Samuel Alito, the opinion also made clear that Roe and Casey were wrongly
decided and were now overruled.5
The impact of Dobbs on the health and well-being of women cannot be
overstated.6 States that oppose abortion are now empowered to regulate,
restrict, and prohibit abortion well before viability, which was the time frame
previously established by Casey.7 As a result, many women will now be
subjected to forced pregnancy and childbirth. They will suffer the physical
and emotional trauma that results from an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy,
including heightened risks of mental health issues and maternal morbidity
and mortality.8 Women will also suffer from the risk of complications
associated with nonviable pregnancies and miscarriages. 9 In the absence of
1

142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
410 U.S. 113 (1973); 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3
See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2283.
4
See id. at 2283–84.
5
See id. at 2242.
6
This Essay regularly refers to the impact of Dobbs on women. It does so for two reasons.
First, most zombie laws and trigger laws specifically identify women as the subjects of
abortion restrictions. Second, the case law consistently addresses the rights of women.
However, Dobbs will also affect transgender men and nonbinary individuals. See Olivia
McCormack, Transgender Advocates Say the End of Roe Would Have Dire
Consequences, WASH. POST (May 6, 2022, 11:37 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/06/transgender-men-nonbinary-peopleabortion-roe/. Accordingly, this Essay uses gender-neutral language when appropriate.
7
See 505 U.S. at 846.
8
See Press Release, Am. Psych. Assoc., Restricting Access to Abortion Likely to Lead to
Mental Health Harms, APA Asserts (May 3, 2022),
https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2022/05/restricting-abortion-mental-health-harms
[https://perma.cc/JAU5-6LVS]; Mariana Lenharo, Being Denied an Abortion Has Lasting
Impacts on Health and Finances, SCI. AM. (Dec. 22, 2021),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/being-denied-an-abortion-has-lasting-impactson-health-and-finances/.
9
See Frances Stead Sellers & Fenit Nirappil, Confusion Post-Roe Spurs Delays, Denials
for Some Lifesaving Pregnancy Care, WASH. POST (July 16, 2022, 9:09 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/07/16/abortion-miscarriage-ectopic2
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statutory exceptions, victims of rape and incest may be forced to endure the
devastating effects of their trauma for the rest of their lives. 10
Pursuant to Dobbs, states could now require women to notify their spouses
or partners before seeking an abortion. 11 Indeed, women seeking abortions
could even be required to obtain consent, thereby delegating control of their
health care decisions to others.12 Young girls could be compelled to notify
their parents or receive parental consent before accessing reproductive health
services.13 Victims of domestic violence could be forced to seek the consent
of their abusers.14 There are significant financial and professional
consequences stemming from the Dobbs decision as well.15 Although the
fallout from Dobbs will affect all women seeking abortions, it will have a

pregnancy-care/; Sonia M. Suter, All the Ways Dobbs Will Harm Pregnant Women,
Whether or Not They Want an Abortion, SLATE (June 29, 2022, 4:35 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/06/dobbs-pregnant-women-surveillance-ivf-bansabortion.html.
10
See Victoria Reyes, Opinion, I Am the Product of Rape. Here’s Why I Support Abortion
Rights, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2022, 3:06 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-06-12/abortion-reproductive-justice-rightsroe-supreme-court-product-of-rape; Jan Hoffman, The New Abortion Bans: Almost No
Exceptions for Rape, Incest or Health, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/health/abortion-bans-rape-incest.html; Elaine
Godfrey, The GOP’s Strange Turn Against Rape Exceptions, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2022/05/supreme-court-overturn-roe-v-wadeno-rape-incest-exceptions/629747/; Jennifer Haberkorn, Rape Exceptions to Abortion Bans
Were Once Widely Accepted. No More, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2022, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-04-08/red-states-eliminate-rape-exceptionsfrom-abortion-bans.
11
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022). In Casey, the
Supreme Court held that spousal notification laws were unconstitutional. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992).
12
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Supreme Court held that
spousal consent requirements during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy were
unconstitutional. See 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
13
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court held that parental consent requirements were
unconstitutional in the absence of a judicial bypass option. See 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
14
In Casey, the Court recognized the profound consequences of a spousal notification
requirement on women facing domestic violence. See 505 U.S. at 888–93.
15
See Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Devastating Economic Impacts of an Abortion Ban, NEW
YORKER (May 11, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-devastatingeconomic-impacts-of-an-abortion-ban; Caitlin Knowles Myers & Morgan Welch, What
Can Economic Research Tell Us About the Effect of Abortion Access on Women’s Lives?,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-can-economicresearch-tell-us-about-the-effect-of-abortion-access-on-womens-lives/
[https://perma.cc/8N9Q-PSZM].
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disproportionate impact on women of color and poor women, who often have
fewer resources and less access to health care.16
Through Dobbs, the Supreme Court has triggered a mass criminalization
event in the United States, where millions of people may now be prosecuted
for acts that were once legal and constitutionally protected.17 These laws
apply to women, transgender men, and nonbinary individuals.18 They create
potential legal liability for families, friends, health care professionals,
employers, and coworkers.19 There are few historic parallels.20
Of course, the potential impact of Dobbs is not limited to reproductive
autonomy. Having ended nearly fifty years of precedent and weakened the
principle of stare decisis, the Court’s reasoning could extend far beyond the
abortion debate.21 There are numerous unenumerated rights that have been
16

See Khaleda Rahman, Roe v. Wade Being Overturned Will Harm Black Women the
Most, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2021, 6:05 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/overturning-roeharmblack-women-most-1653082; Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice,
Racial Justice, and the Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2093 (2021);
Jamila K. Taylor, Structural Racism and Maternal Health Among Black Women, 48 J.L.,
MED. & ETHICS 506, 510–11 (2020).
17
See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Opinion, In Louisiana, A Dark Turn in the Post-Roe Wars
Signals Danger Ahead, WASH. POST (July 5, 2022, 11:29 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/05/louisiana-abortion-trigger-bansupreme-court-roe-v-wade/; Erin Douglas & Eleanor Klibanoff, Abortion Funds Languish
in Legal Turmoil, Their Leaders Fearing Jail Time If They Help Texans, TEX. TRIB. (June
29, 2022, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/06/29/texas-abortion-funds-legal/
[https://perma.cc/6SAX-JMG3].
18
Committed spouses and partners—regardless of gender—will also be affected by Dobbs.
They will no longer have the ability to make family planning decisions in the absence of
state intervention. See Andréa Becker, Opinion, Men Have a Lot to Lose When Roe
Falls, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/26/opinion/menabortion.html; Amanda Jayne Miller, Opinion, Unsuspecting Men Don’t Yet Know That
Overturning Roe v. Wade Will Also Change Their Lives, USA TODAY (May 11, 2022, 4:00
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnists/2022/05/11/abortion-law-roesupreme-court-men/9667205002/?gnt-cfr=1.
19
See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Ava Sasani, Doctor Informed State of 10-Year-Old
Girl’s Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/14/us/10year-old-abortion-caitlin-bernard-indiana.html (discussing state laws criminalizing medical
professionals instead of “actual criminals”).
20
The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibited
the manufacture, sale, and transportation of “intoxicating liquors,” is perhaps the most
relevant example of criminalizing conduct that was previously legal. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVIII, § 1. Significantly, the Amendment indicated it would not become effective until one
year after ratification. Id.
21
The majority opinion argues that its approach to abortion need not extend to other
unenumerated rights. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2280–
81 (2022). However, the opinion’s own approach to “history and tradition” contradicts that
assertion. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Opinion, How the Right to Birth Control Could Be
Undone, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/opinion/birth-
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protected by the Court through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These rights—the right to contraception, the right to marry, the
right of families to live together, and the right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children—are now at risk of losing their heightened
constitutionally protected status.22 On this point, Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion in Dobbs could not have been clearer. 23
In anticipation of the Court’s decision in Dobbs, several states adopted
“trigger laws” restricting abortion. 24 These laws were explicitly drafted to
take effect if Roe and Casey were overturned. They joined pre-Roe “zombie
laws” that restricted abortion and yet were never rescinded by state
legislatures despite Roe and Casey.25 Collectively, trigger laws and zombie
laws are now being used in several states to impose immediate restrictions on
reproductive autonomy.26
control-abortion-roe-v-wade.html. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The End of Roe v. Wade,
WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2022, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-end-of-roe-vwade-11652453609 (arguing that the Dobbs opinion will not result in the restriction of
other fundamental rights).
22
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 645–46 (2015) (right of same-sex couples to
marry); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (right to consensual sexual
activity by same-sex couples); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06
(1977) (right of families to live together); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right
of interracial couples to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)
(right to contraception); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (right of
parents to control the upbringing of their children).
23
See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2304 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n future cases, we should
‘follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forth certain substantive rights that cannot
be taken away, and adds, beyond that, a right to due process when life, liberty, or property
is to be taken away.’ Substantive due process conflicts with that textual command and has
harmed our country in many ways. Accordingly, we should eliminate it from our
jurisprudence at the earliest opportunity.” (citation omitted)).
24
See Jennifer Calfas, States Prepare to Quickly Implement Abortion ‘Trigger’ Laws,
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2022, 9:10 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-prepare-toquickly-implement-abortion-trigger-laws-11655385028; Jesus Jiménez, What is a Trigger
Law? And Which States Have Them?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/abortion-trigger-laws.html; Casey Parks & Amber
Phillips, What are ‘Trigger’ Laws, and Which States Have Them?, WASH. POST (May 3,
2022, 12:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/12/07/what-is-anabortion-trigger-law/.
25
See Rose Wagner, It’s Not Halloween: Post-Roe America Could See Rise of ‘Zombie’
Abortion Bans, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 6, 2022),
https://www.courthousenews.com/its-not-halloween-post-roe-america-could-see-rise-ofzombie-abortion-bans/ [https://perma.cc/6TRA-B32W]; Michael C. Dorf, Would
Overruling Roe v. Wade Retroactively Reanimate “Zombie” Abortion Laws?, VERDICT
(Sept. 13, 2021), https://verdict.justia.com/2021/09/13/would-overruling-roe-v-waderetroactively-reanimate-zombie-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/HN4B-SQMY].
26
See After Roe Fell: Abortion Laws by State, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.,
https://reproductiverights.org/maps/abortion-laws-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/QDY8-
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This Essay argues that the use of zombie laws and trigger laws to prohibit
and criminalize abortion violates the rule of legality—there is no crime in the
absence of a duly enacted law.27 In fact, zombie laws and trigger laws are not
laws.28 When the Supreme Court affirmed the right to abortion in Roe and
reaffirmed that right in Casey, any inconsistent state laws were voided. When
states adopted laws contrary to Roe and Casey in the hope of future reversal,
these laws were void ab initio (void from inception). Dobbs ended the
protections afforded by Roe and Casey, but it does not have the power to
resuscitate or activate these state laws. In the absence of new state legislation
adopted after Dobbs, any prosecution under zombie laws or trigger laws
would violate the rule of legality and the corollary maxim of nullum crimen
sine lege—there is no crime in the absence of law.
Part II of this Essay offers a brief summary of Roe, Casey, and now Dobbs.
Part III then examines the current status of zombie laws and trigger laws in
the United States. There are thirteen states with trigger laws regulating
abortion.29 Zombie laws exist in nine states.30 Collectively, these laws will
affect millions of women and countless other individuals.31 In response, Part
MKDP] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022). This issue has received significant scholarly attention
for over thirty years. See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of Abortion in the
States if Roe v. Wade Is Overruled, 27 ISSUES L. & MED. 181, 221 (2012); Matthew Berns,
Note, Trigger Laws, 97 GEO. L.J. 1639, 1641–46 (2009); Heidi S. Alexander, Note, The
Theoretic and Democratic Implications of Anti-Abortion Trigger Laws, 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 381, 384–88 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the
Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 616–21 (2007); Teresa L.
Scott, Note, Burying the Dead: The Case Against Revival of Pre-Roe and Pre-Casey
Abortion Statutes in a Post-Casey World, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 355, 363–65
(1991). Because of Dobbs, it is no longer a hypothetical issue.
27
See H.L.A. Hart, Philosophy of Law, Problems of, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 264, 273–74 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (“The requirements that the law . . .
should be general . . . ; should be free from contradictions, ambiguities, and obscurities;
should be publicly promulgated and easily accessible; and should not be retrospective in
operation are usually referred to as the principles of legality.”); see also Jeremy Waldron,
The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (describing the similarities
between the rule of law and the rule of legality); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law”
as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (arguing that
“the Rule of Law needs to be understood as a concept of multiple, complexly interwoven
strands”).
28
This Essay uses the terms “zombie laws” and “trigger laws” because they are routinely
used to describe these legislative acts. However, the use of the word “law” does not reflect
their actual legal status.
29
See infra Part III.B.
30
See infra Part III.A.
31
Dobbs will also have a significant effect on states that protect reproductive autonomy.
See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, Newsom Signs Bill Protecting California Abortion Providers
from Civil Liability, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2022, 2:57 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-06-24/newsom-signs-bill-protecting-
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IV argues that these laws cannot be used to restrict or prohibit abortion
because this would violate the rule of legality. Under the rule of legality,
zombie laws are void, and trigger laws are void ab initio.32 Thus, advocates
of reproductive autonomy should not concede the applicability of these laws.
There are compelling arguments to be made. Indeed, these arguments extend
to any subject area where zombie laws remain “on the books” or trigger laws
await activation.33
The rule of legality offers only temporary protection against abortion
restrictions in states where these statutes exist. Pursuant to Dobbs, state
legislatures may adopt de novo restrictions on reproductive autonomy. 34 Until
such time, courts should reject any efforts to restrict access to abortion
through outdated and void legislation.35 Prosecutors should also consider

california-abortion-providers-from-civil-liability (referencing research that thousands of
women will travel to California seeking abortion care); Fahima Haque, Which States Are
Reinforcing Abortion Rights?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/abortion-rights-protections.html (listing several
bills that seek to protect the right to abortion care); Elaine Kamarck, What Happens After
Roe v. Wade?, BROOKINGS (May 3, 2022),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2022/05/03/america-after-roe-v-wade/
[https://perma.cc/M5K7-DTYU] (describing how Dobbs will have implications beyond the
borders of states that prohibit abortion).
32
See infra Part IV.
33
See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Zombie Laws, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047
(2022) (describing zombie laws that implicate abortion, social media regulation, and
defamation); Maureen E. Brady, Zombie State Constitutional Provisions, 2021 WIS. L.
REV. 1063 (2021) (describing zombie laws that implicate various legal issues); Jordan Carr
Peterson, The Walking Dead: How the Criminal Regulation of Sodomy Survived Lawrence
v. Texas, 86 MO. L. REV. 857 (2021) (describing zombie laws that implicate consensual
sexual activity).
34
The rule of legality does not prevent constitutional challenges or jurisprudential changes.
When a state adopts legislation contrary to Supreme Court precedent, it would be
challenged through litigation. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Dobbs. The
Supreme Court’s authority to engage in judicial review is distinct from whether the
outcome of such review should reanimate zombie laws or activate trigger laws.
35
The battle in state courts has already begun. See, e.g., Rachel Roubein & McKenzie
Beard, Abortion Providers Are Turning to State Courts to Halt Bans, WASH. POST (June
28, 2022, 8:27 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/28/abortionproviders-are-turning-state-courts-halt-bans/ (addressing the complex legal issues raised in
state litigation); Shawn Hubler & Mitch Smith, Abortion Rights Groups Take Up the Fight
in the States, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/27/us/abortion-rights-states.html (referencing legal
challenges to restrictive state abortion laws); Luke Vander Ploeg, Michigan Judge
Suspends an Abortion Ban from 1931, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/17/us/michigan-abortion-ban.html.
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whether bringing charges for violating these laws comports with the rule of
legality.36
II. THE LAW OF ROE AND CASEY—AND NOW DOBBS
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court confronted a challenge to a Texas
statute that criminalized abortion except in cases where it was necessary to
save the life of the mother. 37 Under the applicable federal jurisdictional
statute at that time, the Court considered the case as a direct appeal from a
special three-judge panel which held the Texas statute void.38 The Court
analyzed the constitutionality of the statute through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe was one of several cases where the Court
would address this discrete yet profound constitutional issue.39
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Blackmun acknowledged the “sensitive
and emotional nature of the abortion controversy,” as well as its complexity. 40
Informed by “the relative weights of the respective interests involved,” “the
lessons and examples of medical and legal history,” “the lenity of the
common law,” and “the demands of the profound problems of the present
day,” the Court developed a trimester framework for assessing permissible

36

See Steve Descano, Opinion, My Governor Can Pass Bad Abortion Laws. But I Won’t
Enforce Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/opinion/prosecutor-abortion-virginia.html
(describing how prosecutors can use their inherent discretion to decline prosecution of
abortion providers); Jonathan Shorman, In Kansas City, Prosecution of Abortion Not
Expected if Missouri Ban Triggered, KAN. CITY STAR (May 18, 2022, 7:26 AM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article261520747.html (describing
how prosecution of abortion providers “impede[s] medical care” and “alienat[es]
communities”).
37
410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
38
See id. at 121–22; 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958). This jurisdictional statute was repealed in
1976. See generally Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge
District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413 (2019) (describing the
mechanics of three-judge district courts); David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court
in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1964) (describing the situations in which
a three-judge court is required).
39
In United States v. Vuitch, the Court held that a D.C. statute prohibiting abortion except
in cases where the mother’s life or health was at risk was not unconstitutionally vague. 402
U.S. 62, 70–72 (1971). However, the Court did not address whether the right to abortion
itself was a substantive due process right entitled to heightened protection under the Due
Process Clause.
40
Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. Although moral standards and religious beliefs informed the
abortion debate, the Court recognized other factors were also relevant, including concerns
about “population growth, pollution, poverty, and ra[ce].” See id.
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state regulation of abortion. 41 This framework sought to balance the
competing and significant interests in the case.
According to the Court, the level of permissible state regulation of
abortion increased with each trimester. The first trimester was defined as the
period of time between conception and the end of the first three months of
pregnancy, when a mother’s risk of “mortality in abortion may be less than
mortality in normal childbirth.”42 During the first trimester, a woman’s right
to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy was her own, informed by “the
medical judgment” of her physician.43 The second trimester was defined as
the time period between three and six months of pregnancy, the end of which
coincided with the potential viability of the fetus “outside the mother’s
womb.”44 During the second trimester, the state had a greater interest in
overseeing the abortion decision and could “regulate the abortion procedure
to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health.”45 In the third trimester, fetal viability became
the deciding factor. At this point, the state could choose to “regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”46 Applying
this framework, the Court struck down the Texas statute because it failed to
consider the stages of pregnancy or a woman’s interests in the abortion
decision.47
When Roe was decided by the Court, it affirmed the legal status of
abortion in the United States. It was, however, subject to withering
criticism.48 Some states adopted legislation that pushed the boundaries of the

41

Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 163.
43
See id. at 164.
44
Id. at 163.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 165.
47
See id. at 162–64.
48
See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 937–43 (1973) (arguing that the Court could have used a different approach
to overturn the Texas statute at issue in Roe). See generally Clarke D. Forsythe, A Draft
Opinion Overruling Roe v. Wade, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 445 (2018) (proposing a
draft opinion for overruling Roe); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After)
Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011) (arguing that
reliance on “courts to vindicate rights is too often counter-productive”); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 373, 377 (2007) (arguing how Roe “provoke[d] intense opposition” inspiring
political mobilization “us[ing] every available political means to press . . . [the] courts” for
judicial decisions “hostile to . . . equality of women and the separation of church and
state”).
42
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trimester framework and the scope of permissible restrictions. 49 On several
occasions, the Court revisited Roe to reconsider its position on the
constitutional protections afforded to reproductive rights.50
Almost twenty years later, the Supreme Court affirmed Roe’s essential
holding in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.51 In
Casey, however, the Court replaced Roe’s trimester framework with a
semester framework, using viability as the temporal divider. 52 Before
viability, Casey established an “undue burden” standard that allowed women
to make informed decisions about their reproductive rights but also allowed
for some level of state regulation. 53 Such regulations were justified so long
as they did not pose a “substantial obstacle” for women seeking an abortion.54
After viability, the state interest was seen as sufficiently compelling so that it
could prohibit abortion except where it was necessary to protect the life or
health of the mother.55
Casey affirmed Roe’s essential holding of heightened constitutional
protection for reproductive autonomy. However, it still did not end the
abortion debate. States continued to push the boundaries of permissible
regulation, forcing the Court to repeatedly revisit the undue burden
standard.56 These state efforts were emboldened by the Court’s changing
ideological composition, and the argument that reproductive rights were not
entitled to heightened constitutional protection.57 Although the Court
49

See generally M. David Bryant, Jr., State Legislation on Abortion after Roe v. Wade:
Selected Constitutional Issues, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 101 (1976) (citing state laws passed after
Roe which retained criminal penalties of the kind which might be impermissible under
Roe).
50
See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513–21 (1989) (addressing
several restrictions on abortion); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759–60 (1986) (addressing twenty-four hour waiting period
and informed consent requirements). See generally Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling,
Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83
(1989) (arguing that Webster eviscerated Roe without overruling it).
51
505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
52
See id. at 878–79.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See id. at 879.
56
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (addressing the constitutionality
of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act). See generally Steven G. Calabresi,
Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008)
(discussing the Gonzales Court’s approach to substantive due process).
57
See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
reiterate my view that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe v.
Wade, has no basis in the Constitution.” (citations omitted)); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 741–42 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Having deprived abortion opponents of the
political right to persuade the electorate that abortion should be restricted by law, the Court
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continued to uphold abortion rights in several cases, it became clear that the
Court’s ideological composition would determine whether reproductive
autonomy would remain a privileged and protected right.58
In 2018, Mississippi adopted the Gestational Age Act, which prohibited
most abortions after fifteen weeks. 59 In its legislative findings clause, the Act
cited language from both Roe and Casey that acknowledged a state’s interest
in protecting the potential for human life. 60 However, the Act made no
reference to the operative language from Roe or Casey protecting the right to
abortion before viability. On the day the Act was signed into law, Jackson
Women’s Health Organization and one of its doctors filed a federal lawsuit
challenging the Act and sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin its
enforcement.61 The district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive
relief and eventually held that the Act was unconstitutional. 62 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Roe and Casey.63 The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari to address whether “all pre-viability prohibitions
on elective abortions are unconstitutional.” 64
In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Court rejected
almost fifty years of precedent to overturn both Roe and Casey.65 Written by
Justice Alito, the opinion framed its approach through both a textualist and
originalist lens, finding that the Constitution contained no provisions
protecting or even addressing the right to abortion.66 Although unenumerated
today continues and expands its assault upon their individual right to persuade women
contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong. Because, like the rest of our
abortion jurisprudence, today’s decision is in stark contradiction of the constitutional
principles we apply in all other contexts, I dissent.”).
58
See, e.g., June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (striking
down restrictions on abortion providers); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S.
582, 591 (2016) (same).
59
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191(4)(b) (2018). The Act allowed for abortions in two
limited circumstances: in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality.
See id.
60
See id. § 41-41-191(2)(b)(7).
61
See Richard Fausset, Mississippi Bans Abortions After 15 Weeks; Opponents Swiftly Sue,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/mississippiabortion-ban.html.
62
See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536, 545 (S.D. Miss.
2018).
63
See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 271, 277 (5th Cir. 2019).
64
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct.
2228 (2022) (No. 19-1392).
65
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022).
66
See id. Given his longstanding criticism of Roe, it is unsurprising that Justice Alito wrote
the majority opinion. See, e.g., Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito to the Solic. Gen. 9
(June 3, 1985), https://www.archives.gov/files/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89216/Thornburgh-v-ACOG-1985-box20-memoFriedtoAlito-June3.pdf.
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rights were still subject to some constitutional protection, the Court indicated
that heightened protection was only available for those rights that were
“rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition” and were considered “an
essential component of . . . ‘ordered liberty.’”67 Despite the historical findings
identified in both Roe and Casey, the Court found no such historical support
for the right to abortion.68
The Court then addressed why stare decisis did not support upholding Roe
and Casey. Although the Court recognized its value and significance, it did
not view stare decisis as “an inexorable command.”69 According to Justice
Alito, five factors counseled overruling Roe and Casey: “the nature of their
error, the quality of their reasoning, the ‘workability’ of the rules they
imposed on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas of the law, and
the absence of concrete reliance.”70 Collectively, these five factors justified
ending Roe and Casey as legal precedent.71
The Court rejected several legal and policy concerns with its decision. It
acknowledged that many Americans would disagree with its decision, yet it
refused to defer to public opinion. 72 Moreover, the Court indicated that Roe
and Casey had not resolved the abortion issue; they “inflamed” it and
prolonged “a rancorous national controversy.” 73 (Presumably, Justice Alito
believes his own opinion will escape this fate.) Responding to concerns that
the Court’s decision could now be used to challenge other unenumerated
rights, the Court attempted to portray its opinion in narrow terms, stating that
its decision “concerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other
right.”74 It also noted that abortion is a “unique act” and distinguishable from
other rights because it implicates the termination of “potential life.” 75
Having established that abortion was not a fundamental right entitled to
protection under strict scrutiny or even the undue burden standard, the Court
determined that restrictions on this right were only entitled to rational basis
review.76 Under rational basis review, state action will be upheld “if there is
67

See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2244.
See id. at 2248–49. To bolster its historical analysis, the Court included two appendices.
The first appendix listed all the state statutes criminalizing abortion that existed in 1868,
which was the operative date of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2285–97. The
second appendix listed all the statutes criminalizing abortion in the Territories that became
states as well as in the District of Columbia. See id. at 2297–300.
69
See id. at 2278.
70
Id. at 2265.
71
See id.
72
See id. at 2278.
73
Id. at 2279.
74
See id. at 2277.
75
Id. at 2258, 2277.
76
See id. at 2283–84.
68
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a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve
legitimate state interests.”77 The Court found several such legitimate
interests, which were sufficient to justify Mississippi’s legislation prohibiting
abortions after fifteen weeks. 78
In closing, the Court acknowledged that “[a]bortion presents a profound
moral question.”79 Accordingly, it is a question that should be answered, not
by the Constitution, but by “the people and their elected representatives.” 80
The Court’s decision to uphold the Mississippi statute was 6-3. Chief Justice
Roberts concurred in this outcome, but he disagreed with the Court’s broader
decision to overturn Roe and Casey.81 In a rare joint dissent, Justices Breyer,
Kagan, and Sotomayor conveyed grave concerns with the Court’s decision,
its impact on women, and its potential extension to other constitutional
rights.82
III. ZOMBIE LAWS AND TRIGGER LAWS
Roe and Casey reflected the “law of the land” for many years. However,
the landscape of reproductive rights was far from clear. Some states never
rescinded abortion laws that were contrary to the Court’s explicit holdings. 83
Other states adopted laws in direct contravention of the Court’s decisions. 84
Many of these laws included a juridical condition precedent—that they would
go into effect only if the Court reversed Roe and Casey. Zombie laws and
trigger laws share similar features. However, they are distinct.85

77

Id. at 2284.
These interests included: “respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all stages of
development; the protection of maternal health and safety; the elimination of particularly
gruesome or barbaric medical procedures; the preservation of the integrity of the medical
profession; the mitigation of fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, or disability.” Id. (citations omitted).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See id. at 2310–11 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
82
See id. at 2317–19 (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
83
See infra text accompanying note 94.
84
See infra text accompanying note 100.
85
See Wasserman, supra note 33, at 1059–67 (describing three types of zombie laws);
Berns, supra note 26, at 1647–50 (distinguishing trigger laws from other statutes);
Alexander, supra note 26, at 388–93 (distinguishing revival laws and sunset laws).
78

2022]

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

89

A. ZOMBIE LAWS

When a law is first adopted by an authorized political body, it is placed in
a designated section of the statutory code. 86 The term “zombie law” refers to
legislation that has been found unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to
extant law and yet still remains in the statutory code.87 Although these laws
are codified, they are unenforceable because of a judicial decision. Zombie
laws exist in countless areas of law.88
Several legal commentators have argued that unconstitutional laws never
die; they are merely dormant.89 Because they remain codified and have not
been formally rescinded by the legislature, they may become enforceable if
the relevant jurisprudence changes. For example, Jonathan F. Mitchell argues
that “federal courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the
statute books, and they have no power to veto or suspend a statute.” 90 When
a court finds a statute unconstitutional, he argues, this simply permits the
court to decline enforcement and to enjoin officials from enforcing the
statute.91 These adverse rulings do not “str[ike] down,” “nullif[y],” or

86

See Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law,
101 LAW LIBR. J. 545, 545–46 (2009). See generally 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28.2 (Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed.
2010) (“The official record of legislative action is the enrolled bill deposited with the
secretary of state. All other reproductions of the law must conform to it to claim
authenticity.”) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND].
87
The term was first used in Pool v. City of Houston. 978 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2020)
(describing a city ordinance as a zombie law because it remained codified even though the
U.S. Supreme Court had found a similar law to be unconstitutional). See Wasserman, supra
note 33, at 1051. Zombie laws have also been referred to as “revival laws.” See Alexander,
supra note 26, at 389.
88
See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J.
1135, 1199 (2019) (noting that the Texas statute criminalizing sodomy remains codified
despite Lawrence v. Texas); Gabriel J. Chin, Roger Hartley, Kevin Bates, Rona Nichols, Ira
Shiflett & Salmon Shomade, Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation Laws Fifty
Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 457, 457 (noting that
many segregationist laws remain codified despite Brown v. Board of Education). See
generally Philip K. Howard, Obsolete Law—The Solutions, ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/obsolete-law-0151-thesolutions/255141/ (proposing new structures to more efficiently clean out obsolete laws);
John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996) (discussing ways
of correcting statutory mistakes).
89
See, e.g., Erica Frohman Plave, Note, The Phenomenon of Antique Laws: Can a State
Revive Old Abortion Laws in a New Era?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 113 (1989); Earl T.
Crawford, The Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional Statute, 49 MICH. L. REV. 645, 651
(1951).
90
Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 936 (2018).
91
See id.
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“render[] ‘void’” legislation.92 Mitchell refers to this as the “writ-of-erasure
fallacy.”93
Although Roe limited state authority to restrict abortion, several states did
not formally rescind laws that were contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision.
In fact, there are currently nine states with pre-Roe zombie laws: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.94 The law of each state differs. However, they each purport
to restrict or prohibit abortion altogether. If the writ-of-erasure fallacy is
correct, the zombie laws of these nine states were revived by Dobbs and are
now valid and enforceable.95
B. TRIGGER LAWS

The term “trigger law” refers to legislation that is adopted in anticipation
of a future act. Until the condition precedent occurs, the law remains dormant.
Most trigger laws explicitly include the condition precedent in the
legislation.96 Some trigger laws are immediately activated upon the
occurrence of the condition precedent;97 others are activated after a brief
waiting period.98
As the Supreme Court began its inexorable journey to Dobbs, several
states announced their intention to adopt trigger laws that would activate in
the event Roe and Casey were overturned.99 Upon activation by the juridical
condition precedent, these laws would criminalize abortion in their
jurisdictions. There are currently thirteen states with trigger laws: Arkansas,
92

Id. at 942.
Id. at 937.
94
Abortion Policy in the Absence of Roe, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-policy-absence-roe (last visited
Nov. 8, 2022) [https://perma.cc/GC3K-PRSV] [hereinafter GUTTMACHER INST.].
95
See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Linton, Enforcement of State Abortion Statutes After Roe: A
State-by-State Analysis, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 157, 237 (1990).
96
See e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-213 (2019);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-214 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-5.1 (2005); IDAHO
CODE § 18-622 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7a-301 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.017
(2019).
97
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-5.1 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7a-301
(2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.017 (2019).
98
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-213 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-214 (2020)
(activates in thirty days); IDAHO CODE § 18-622 (2020) (same).
99
See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Mitch Smith & Luke Vander Ploeg, Oklahoma Legislature
Passes Bill Banning Almost All Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/oklahoma-ban-abortions.html; Summer
Ballentine, Missouri Governor Signs Bill Banning Abortions at 8 Weeks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May 24, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/80bfa84a31cb449cb5a60e1a24d7f8a7
[https://perma.cc/JAV6-C3XR].
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Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. 100
In Louisiana, for example, the Human Life Protection Act (Act 467) was
enacted in 2006 and provides:
No person may knowingly administer to, prescribe for, or procure for, or sell to
any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, or other substance with the specific
intent of causing or abetting the termination of the life of an unborn human being.
No person may knowingly use or employ any instrument or procedure upon a
pregnant woman with the specific intent of causing or abetting the termination of
the life of an unborn human being.101

Because Roe and Casey prevented states from adopting absolute prohibitions
on abortion, the Act did not take effect immediately. Instead, the Louisiana
legislature indicated the Act would become effective upon the occurrence of
either of the following two conditions:
(1) Any decision of the United States Supreme Court which reverses, in
whole or in part, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed. 2d 147
(1973), thereby, restoring to the state of Louisiana the authority to prohibit
abortion.
(2) Adoption of an amendment to the United States Constitution which, in
whole or in part, restores to the state of Louisiana the authority to prohibit
abortion.102

If trigger laws are viable and simply awaiting activation, Dobbs activated the
Human Life Protection Act.
Collectively, zombie laws and trigger laws are poised to curtail
reproductive rights for millions of women now that the Supreme Court has
issued its opinion in Dobbs.103 Although they represent distinct legal
100

See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 94.
LA. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.30 (2006) (current version at LA. STAT. ANN § 40:1061(C)).
102
Id. § 40:1061(A).
103
The effective date of a Supreme Court opinion varies based on whether the case arises
out of state or federal proceedings. See SUP. CT. R. 45. For example, a mandate shall be
issued twenty-five days after entry of judgment in a case on review from a state court
unless the Court shortens or extends the time. SUP. CT. R. 45(2). If the case is on review
from a federal court, there is no formal mandate unless the Court requests that a mandate
be issued. See SUP. CT. R. 45(3). Instead, the Supreme Court clerk will send a copy of the
opinion and a certified copy of the judgment to the lower court. See id. See generally Josh
Blackman, When Does a Supreme Court Judgment Become Effective?, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (July 17, 2020, 5:35 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/07/17/when-doesa-supreme-court-judgment-become-effective/ [https://perma.cc/3TP5-VUVE].
101
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scenarios, zombie laws and trigger laws share several features. First, they
purport to establish law based upon a future jurisprudential change—a
juridical condition precedent. Second, they bind future polities with laws that
have been found unconstitutional either before or after their adoption. Third,
they generate criminal liability for an activity that was lawful prior to the
jurisprudential change. Each of these features implicates the rule of legality.
IV. THE RULE OF LEGALITY: NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE
The rule of legality is one of the oldest and most fundamental norms of
due process and the rule of law.104 It has been referred to as “the first principle
of American criminal law jurisprudence.” 105 To be valid and enforceable, a
law must be duly enacted by the appropriate legislative body through
established procedures.106 When the government acts outside of its lawful and
delegated authority, such acts are considered ultra vires.107 A law that was
enacted in such manner is void ab initio.108 Laws that are subsequently found
unconstitutional are void. The rule of legality is reflected in several
principles, including the abolition of common law crimes, the prohibition of
ex post facto laws, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine.109 It can also be

104

See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 335, 336 (2005); see also KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF
LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 14–15 (2009); Peter
Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 LAW & PHIL. 229, 229 (2007).
105
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 39 (7th ed. 2015).
106
See GALLANT, supra note 104, at 15 (“[L]egality is a requirement that the specific
crimes, punishments, and courts be established legally – within the prevailing legal
system.”).
107
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (“Both [agencies’] power to act
and how they are to act are authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that when they act
improperly, no less than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra
vires.”). See generally Michael Sebring, Note, Restoring the Essential Safeguard: Why the
Abbott Test for Preclusion of Judicial Review of Agency Action Is an Inadequate Method
for Protecting Separation of Powers, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181 (2020) (arguing that
Congress may not prevent judicial review of agency actions, particularly when such actions
may be ultra vires); James Barclay Smith, Relief from Ultra Vires Governmental Action, 42
MARQ. L. REV. 429 (1959) (discussing problematic ultra vires governmental action).
108
See Gusman v. Marrero, 180 U.S. 81, 83 (1901) (“[The Act] goes far beyond the limits
of legislative authority, is ultra vires, and absolutely null and void, and everything done
under it equally null and void.”).
109
See Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s
Peculiar Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1625, 1632 (2017); Robinson, supra note 104, at 337.
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understood by reference to the maxim, nullum crimen sine lege—there is no
crime in the absence of law.110
The rule of legality has a profound impact on zombie laws and trigger
laws. Despite their eponymous names, zombie laws and trigger laws are not
laws. And despite its compelling narrative, the writ-of-erasure fallacy is itself
a fallacy.
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS
First, trigger laws violate the separation of powers by delegating
legislative authority to the U.S. Supreme Court.111 All legislation requires
interpretation, which means all laws leave “some residuum of policymaking
power” to the courts.112 For this reason, judicial review is essential in any
legal system. There is, however, a meaningful distinction between passive
interpretation and active construction: “[A]t some point a line is crossed
between a nuanced, interstitial job of interpreting reasonably definite statutes
as applied to specific cases and a full bore assignment to the courts to create
the crime in the first instance.”113
Consider, for example, the trigger law adopted by Texas. The Human Life
Protection Act (H.B. 1280) was adopted by the Texas legislature in 2021. 114
The law established criminal liability for any person who “perform[s],
induce[s], or attempt[s] an abortion.”115 However, it did not take effect upon
its adoption. Rather, the law provided that H.B. 1280 shall take effect on the
thirtieth day after:
110

See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of
Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 121 (2008); Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47
YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1937). See generally Stefan Glaser, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, 24 J.
COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 29 (1942) (discussing the origin and purpose of nullum crimen
sine lege). The principle of nulla poena sine lege (there is no punishment in the absence of
law) is a corollary to nullum crimen sine lege.
111
SUTHERLAND, supra note 86, § 4:6 (“The doctrine of separation of powers does not
permit a legislature to abdicate its function to the judiciary by passing statutes which
operate at the discretion of the courts, or under which courts are allowed to determine
conditions in which the statute will be enforced.”).
112
See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428 (2008).
113
Steven Wisotsky, Can the Federal Courts Create Crimes?, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1432,
1433 (2014).
114
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170A.002 (2021). Both its name and
substantive provisions mimic the Louisiana abortion statute. See supra text accompanying
notes 101–102.
115
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170A.002(a) (2021). The statute includes limited
exceptions, such as situations where the abortion is necessary to protect the life of the
mother or is necessary to prevent the substantial impairment of a major bodily function.
See id. § 170A.002(b)(2).
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(1) the issuance of a United States Supreme Court judgment overruling,
wholly or partly, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as modified by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), thereby allowing the states of
the United States to prohibit abortion;
(2) the issuance of any other United States Supreme Court decision that
recognizes, wholly or partly, the authority of the states to prohibit abortion;
or
(3) adoption of an amendment to the United States Constitution that, wholly
or partly, restores to the states the authority to prohibit abortion.116

Essentially, Texas inserted a juridical condition precedent into the law and
delegated adoption of the criminal provisions of the Act to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Unlike legislation that requires a court to interpret and apply extant
law, this statute empowers the Supreme Court to decide if, when, and even
how these provisions would go into effect. 117 This represents an extraordinary
degree of legislative delegation.
Not all forms of delegation are unconstitutional. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has upheld many examples.118 A key factor for assessing their
legitimacy is to determine whether the delegation is accompanied by an
“intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of legislative authority. 119
However, the Supreme Court has been skeptical of delegations that encroach
on the separation of powers and the unique lawmaking authority of
Congress.120
In INS v. Chadha, for example, the Court struck down a portion of the
Immigration and Nationality Act because it granted one chamber of Congress
116

Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1280 § 3, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021). This
provision is codified in the preamble to Chapter 170A of the Texas Health & Safety Code.
117
Cf. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 879–80 (Tex. 2000)
(acknowledging that legislative delegation had occurred because a statute gave private
landowners authority to decide “whether, how, and to what extent” public duties applied to
them).
118
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 354–56 (6th ed.
2019).
119
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
120
The nondelegation doctrine has historically been raised to challenge congressional
delegation of legislative authority to the Executive Branch, including administrative
agencies. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the
Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282–89 (2021); Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano,
The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379 (2017); Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1373–78
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000).
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the authority to veto executive actions. 121 The opinion highlights the
constitutional problems that arise through the transfer of clearly delineated
legislative powers. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that
efforts to bypass the fulsome features of the legislative process were
inconsistent with the careful checks and balances crafted by the Framers. 122
To “preserve freedom” and “protect the people from the improvident exercise
of power,” legislation was meant to “be a step-by-step, deliberate and
deliberative process.”123
In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court considered a different form of
delegation and struck down the federal Line Item Veto Act because it allowed
the President to veto duly enacted laws in violation of the Presentment Clause
of the Constitution.124 Again, the Court highlighted the importance of
respecting the established delineation of political authority. Citing Chadha,
the Court noted that “the power to enact statutes may only ‘be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure.’”125 As described by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion,
“liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic
political decisions.”126 Therefore, it was immaterial that Congress
surrendered its own authority or that Congress could adopt a new law
achieving the same outcome. 127
Although these cases involved federal legislation and compliance with the
federal constitution, the core principles conveyed in them regarding
constitutional design, government structure, and the separation of powers
apply with equal rigor to state laws.128
For example, the Texas Constitution establishes the separation of powers
among the three branches of state government and prohibits the delegation of
their respective powers.129 Texas courts have indicated that the separation of
powers “is well established in Texas,” and its principles are informed by the
121

See 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
See id. at 955–59.
123
See id. at 957, 959.
124
See 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
125
Id. at 439–40 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
126
Id. at 450–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127
See id. at 451–52.
128
These principles have a lengthy history in both American and English political theory.
See, e.g., John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 141, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 408 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963) (“The Legislative [sic] cannot transfer the
Power of Making Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the
People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others.” (emphasis in original)). In fact,
many states have explicitly codified the prohibition against delegating authority between
the coordinate branches of government. See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 120, at 415.
129
See TEX. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
122

96

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 111

U.S. Constitution.130 As a result, Texas courts recognize that only the
legislature may pass laws and that this “power cannot be delegated to some
commission or other tribunal.”131 In fact, the Texas Legislative Council’s
Drafting Manual indicates that statutory references to laws that have not been
enacted by the Texas Legislature “raise a question regarding whether the
incorporation by reference is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.”132
Like their federal counterparts, Texas courts have upheld some forms of
delegation, subject to narrow constraints. Significantly, Texas courts have
expressed concern with delegation to laws that did not exist at the time the
delegating statute was enacted.133 The legitimacy of legislative delegation to
the judiciary is also disputed. 134 The Texas Legislative Council’s Drafting
Manual does not even address whether delegation through a juridical
condition precedent is allowed. Although it acknowledges that incorporation
by reference to statutory language may be permissible, it is silent on
incorporation by reference to future judicial opinions.135 These principles of
constitutional design, government structure, and the separation of powers are
not unique to Texas and can be found in other states. 136
130

See Ex parte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. App. 1998); see also Tex. Boll Weevil
Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 465 (Tex. 1997).
131
See Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tex. 1935); see also Ex
parte Leslie, 223 S.W. 227, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (“The power to make laws is
placed by the people, through the Constitution, upon the Legislature.”).
132
TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DRAFTING MANUAL 161
(2020), https://tlc.texas.gov/docs/legref/draftingmanual-87.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR9PYR29].
133
See, e.g., Ex parte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d at 742 (accepting delegation but only to laws that
were in existence at the time the referencing Texas statute was enacted); see also TEXAS
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 132. But see BCCA Appeal Grp., Inc. v. City of
Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1, 24 (Tex. 2016).
134
See, e.g., City of Houston v. Houston Pro. Fire Fighters’ Ass’n, Local 341, 626 S.W.3d
1, 18 (Tex. Ct. App. 2021), review granted (May 27, 2022); City of Port Arthur v. Int’l
Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 397, 807 S.W.2d 894, 898 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Int’l Ass’n
of Firefighters, Local Union No. 2390 v. City of Kingsville, 568 S.W.2d 391, 394–95 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1978).
135
See TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 132, at 159–61; see also id. at 281
(memorandum from Mark Brown, Legal Division Director, Texas Legislative Council).
136
See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of government of the state are divided
into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.”); LA. CONST. art. II, § 2
(“Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any
person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the
others.”); State v. Miller, 857 So.2d 423, 427 (La. 2003) (“Under the separation of powers
doctrine, unless the constitution expressly grants an enumerated legislative power to the
executive or the Legislature has enacted a statute expressly authorizing another branch to
exercise its power, the executive does not have the power to perform a legislative
function.”); Mid-City Auto., L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 267 So.3d 165, 175
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Accordingly, state courts should be skeptical when legislatures delegate
significant authority to other branches of government.137 Delegation of
legislative authority to the judiciary, such as through a juridical condition
precedent, remains a rare occurrence and implicates separation of powers
concerns.138 These concerns are even more pronounced when they involve
delegation to a different sovereign. 139 Both Chadha and Clinton involved
delegation between coordinate branches of the federal government. In
contrast, trigger laws involve delegation from state legislatures to the U.S.
Supreme Court. There is no constraint to this delegation or “intelligible
principle” to guide the Court in its legislative task.140 In fact, constraints
imposed by state legislatures would themselves give rise to separation of
powers and federal supremacy challenges.141 Finally, concerns about
delegation are further heightened in the criminal law realm because “criminal
conviction and sentence represent the ultimate intrusions on personal liberty
(La. Ct. App. 2018) (“Because of the constitutional separation of powers, delegation of
legislative power, either to the people or to any other body of authority, is generally
prohibited.”).
137
See Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent-Powers Corollary, and
Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1414 (2017) (discussing the applicability of
nondelegation doctrine to the judiciary branch); Lemos, supra note 112, at 407–09; Morris
P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46–52 (1982) (analyzing the incentives for legislators to
delegate their responsibilities). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Delegation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722, 1731 (2002) (arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine is far more limited than it is perceived).
138
Perhaps the most well-known example of legislative delegation to the judiciary involves
the Rules Enabling Act. Passed by Congress in 1934, the Act authorizes the Supreme Court
to make rules relating to practice and procedure in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. §
2072(a). However, it contains a significant limitation. Such rules cannot “abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.” Id. § 2072(b). Notwithstanding this significant restriction,
there are still colorable questions about its legitimacy. See Martin H. Redish & Uma M.
Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal
Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1307 (2006).
139
In any federal system, there will inevitably be interactions between federal and state
actors. However, such cross-sovereign interactions must be clearly established. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (authority of Supreme Court to review final judgments issued by state
courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (authority of federal courts to consider state claims); 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b) (removal of state actions to federal courts).
140
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740–41 (Tex. 1995) (recognizing that delegation is
permissible only if the legislature provides “reasonable standards to guide the entity to
which the powers are delegated”).
141
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1459 (2017) (addressing the value of judicial supremacy in the realm of
constitutional interpretation); Hugh E. Willis, The Doctrine of the Supremacy of the
Supreme Court, 6 IND. L.J. 224 (1931) (discussing the doctrine of judicial supremacy).
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and carry with them the stigma of the community’s collective
condemnation.”142 In sum, state legislatures have no authority to cede their
sovereign power through trigger laws. These efforts generate laws that are
void ab initio.
The principle that laws found unconstitutional are void ab initio can be
traced to Marbury v. Madison.143 In his opinion setting forth the core features
of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall stated that “a law repugnant to the
constitution is void.”144 This principle was affirmed by the Court in more
forceful terms in Norton v. Shelby County.145 Writing for the Court, Justice
Field indicated that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”146 This
legal reasoning has also been used by state courts 147 and has been formally
codified in several jurisdictions.148
Some commentators have argued that the void ab initio principle is
mistaken and that courts have no authority to annul legislative
pronouncements. Mitchell, for example, argues that a finding of
unconstitutionality simply means that a court will “decline to enforce a
statute” and that “it permits a court to enjoin executive officials” from
enforcing the statute. 149 Otherwise, the statute remains in abeyance. To hold
otherwise, Mitchell argues, promotes the writ-of-erasure fallacy.150 Other
scholars have made similar arguments about the limited impact of adverse
rulings on a statute’s existence.151
142

See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672–73 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc), rev’d, 578 U.S. 104 (2016); see also Daniel
Richman, Defining Crime, Delegating Authority—How Different Are Administrative
Crimes?, 39 YALE J. REGUL. 304, 307 (2022).
143
See 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
144
Id. at 180; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819).
145
See 118 U.S 425 (1886).
146
Id. at 442.
147
See, e.g., People v. Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (Ill. 1999) (holding that a
facially unconstitutional statute is deemed void ab initio). But see Charles v. Carey, 627
F.2d 772, 779 (7th Cir. 1980) (arguing that Illinois trigger provision did not express “an
unlawful purpose”); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1314, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (same).
148
See, e.g., GA. CONST., art. I, § II, ¶ 5(a) (“Legislative acts in violation of this
Constitution or the Constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so
declare them.”). See also Alexander supra note 26, at 400–02 (discussing how antiabortion trigger laws conflict with nondelegation principles).
149
Mitchell, supra note 90, at 936.
150
See id. at 937.
151
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2000) (“A court has no power to
remove a law from the statute books.”); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal
Declaratory Judgments, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 759, 767 (1979) (“No matter what language is
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These arguments assert that judicial decisions are temporary: “A court’s
constitutional pronouncements reflect only its current views of the
Constitution and the judiciary’s role in enforcing it.” 152 A court may change
its mind.153 Yet, this critique proves too much. 154 If a court’s constitutional
pronouncements reflect only its current views, the same could be said about
legislation: statutes only reflect the views of the legislatures that adopted
them. If a court reverses an earlier decision interpreting a statute, there is no
guarantee (or even likelihood) that its decision corresponds to the views of
the current legislature. Rejecting the void ab initio principle would allow the
reinstatement of laws that may not represent the will of the people and their
elected representatives. 155 These concerns are multiplied in a federal system
that includes fifty distinct legislatures. Instead, these renewed laws would
only represent the views of the current judiciary.
Challenges to the void ab initio principle disregard the structural
shortcomings of trigger laws. Not every legislative act is necessarily a law.
Trigger laws were adopted after a finding of unconstitutionality and purport
to impose future criminal liability through a juridical condition precedent.
This methodology is antithetical to the separation of powers.156 It is contrary
to the purpose of codification, which seeks completeness in the statutory code
and requires statutes to be fully formed when adopted by the designated
used in a judicial opinion, a federal court cannot repeal a duly enacted statute of any
legislative authority.”); see also Frohman Plave, supra note 89, at 116–18; Crawford, supra
note 89, at 647–51.
152
Mitchell, supra note 90, at 942 (emphasis in original).
153
Courts are more likely to “change their mind” when there is a change in their
composition. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 952 (2005).
154
When a court’s composition changes, this does not invalidate the court’s prior decisions.
Courts are neither required nor expected to reaffirm their prior decisions. In fact, the
doctrine of stare decisis explicitly rejects such an approach. See Frederick Schauer, Stare
Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 121, 126; Joseph
W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 789–
92 (2012). Cf. Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 308, 310 (2020) (describing the unique relationship between the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence and stare decisis).
155
See infra Part IV(C).
156
There is an intriguing connection between the separation of powers concerns implicated
in the delegation of legislative authority and the vagueness doctrine. See Arjun Ogale,
Note, Vagueness and Nondelegation, 108 VA. L. REV. 783, 785–86 (2022). In recent years,
this connection has been highlighted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019) (The vagueness doctrine “rests on the twin
constitutional pillars of due process and separation of powers.”); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138
S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (The vagueness “doctrine is a corollary of the separation of
powers—requiring that Congress, rather than the executive or judicial branch, define what
conduct is sanctionable and what is not.”).
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legislative body.157 In fact, this explains why some states explicitly require
statutes to “set forth completely the provisions of the law enacted, amended,
or revived.”158 Matthew Adler and Michael Dorf would argue that legislation
which violates “existence conditions”—such as those that implicate the
mechanisms of lawmaking—do not give rise to “laws.”159 As a result, such
legislative acts would be void ab initio.
B. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Second, the delegation of legislative authority through trigger laws raises
a related concern. Only designated government bodies are authorized to draft
and adopt laws. Although the separation of powers may prevent a government
body from delegating its authority, a distinct issue is whether the government
body receiving this authority is empowered to act on it.
In Texas, for example, the Penal Code provides that “[c]onduct does not
constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal
ordinance, order of a county commissioners court, or rule authorized by and
lawfully adopted under a statute.”160 Texas courts have also indicated that the
legislature alone is vested with the authority to define crimes and fix
punishment for those crimes; only narrow exceptions have been
recognized.161 This highlights the flaws in the Texas Human Life Protection
Act. It delegates the authority of defining the offense to the U.S. Supreme
Court instead of one of the authorized government institutions identified in
the Texas Penal Code. The Louisiana Criminal Code contains a similar
provision, stating that “[a] crime is that conduct which is defined as criminal
in this Code, or in other acts of the legislature, or in the constitution of this
state.”162 Similarly, the Model Penal Code requires criminal offenses to be
codified under the Code or a state statute.163 It is conspicuously silent on other
157

See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25
YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 456–63 (2000).
158
See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(B).
159
See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1145–50 (2003). For example, the Presentment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution constitutes an “existence condition,” and its violation
would render any ensuing law void. Id. at 1117–18. Cf. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling
Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1941–43
(2011) (arguing that courts have the authority to strike down statutes adopted contrary to
procedural lawmaking requirements).
160
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(a) (2003).
161
See supra text accompanying notes 133–135.
162
LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 7 (2006).
163
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“No conduct constitutes an
offense unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or another statute of this State.”);
see also George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3,
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sources. In sum, courts are simply not authorized to engage in the legislative
process, particularly in the criminal law realm.
In fact, trigger laws raise the specter of common law crimes, a system of
law that was replaced long ago. 164 As described by Carissa Hessick, it is
“incompatible with our system of divided government.” 165 Indeed, “[t]he idea
that courts could play a role, let alone a primary role, in deciding what
conduct should be criminalized is seen as antithetical to the rule of law.” 166
If common law crimes have been abolished, “it logically follows that the
power of present courts to create new offenses ought to be similarly
restricted.”167 This explains the motivating rationale behind the Model Penal
Code—to prevent judicial lawmaking by defining offenses with sufficient
scope and clarity.168
Trigger laws are incomplete when drafted, and they are not enforceable
upon their adoption. Instead, they require the fulfillment of a juridical
condition precedent to become fully formed and enforceable. This is
categorically different from the classic paradigm of judicial review and
statutory construction, where courts interpret extant legislation that is fully
formed.169 By delegating such extensive legislative authority to the U.S.
Supreme Court, trigger laws empower the Court to create new crimes, albeit
with state support. Such legislative efforts are void ab initio.
C. DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Finally, both zombie laws and trigger laws raise broader concerns about
democracy and the political process.170 Even in abeyance, these laws have
profound consequences.
Zombie laws and trigger laws chill constitutionally protected activity in
several ways. They send an unmistakable message to affected individuals that
11 (1998) (“The Model Penal Code makes a strong commitment to the principle nulla
poena sine lege in section 1.05(1)[.]”).
164
See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 476 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“the notion of a common-law crime is utterly anathema today”).
165
Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 1013
(2019). To be fair, Professor Hessick argues that the shift from common law crimes to
criminal statutes has its own significant shortcomings.
166
Id. at 966.
167
Robinson, supra note 104, at 341.
168
See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 331–32 (2007).
169
See Richman, supra note 142, at 321; Lemos, supra note 112, at 421.
170
The rule of legality implicates numerous values, including promoting respect for human
rights, supporting the legitimacy and structure of democratic governance, and affirming the
purposes of criminalization. See GALLANT, supra note 104, at 19–20.
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their rights are precariously positioned. These silent laws “convey[] meaning
about the worth and value of the regulated person or conduct.” 171 Such
messages can cause damage through stigma and isolation. 172 They may also
cause individuals to change their behavior because they cannot rely on the
certainty of the law. This may seem puzzling because these laws are inactive
and unenforceable. However, studies have documented statistically
significant correlations between abortion restrictions and women’s decisions
to undergo even lawful abortion procedures.173
The adverse consequences of zombie laws and trigger laws extend to the
political process. For example, William Michael Treanor and Gene B.
Sperling argue that political actors may decline to pursue legislation because
the courts have already acted. 174 Thus, the revival of unconstitutional statutes
may raise legitimacy concerns because the “very act of judicial invalidation
powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations.”175 As a result, these
laws “can produce a result contrary to what the political process would have
produced in the absence of the initial judicial decision.”176
Significantly, zombie laws and trigger laws may not reflect the support of
a state’s citizens at the time the juridical condition precedent is fulfilled. 177
This represents their most significant flaw. 178 The lag time between adoption
and activation of these laws may be years or even decades. As this lag time
grows, their electoral legitimacy becomes more tenuous. Moreover,
intervening developments between adoption and activation may sever any
meaningful connection between these distinct temporal moments.179 When
zombie laws and trigger laws have been considered in abeyance for decades,

171

See Brady, supra note 33, at 1084.
See generally Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81
BROOK. L. REV. 1555 (2016) (examining the consequences of psychological harm in
standing doctrine); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (addressing the nature of
expressive harm).
173
See Brandice Canes-Wrone & Michael C. Dorf, Measuring the Chilling Effect, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1095, 1108 (2015).
174
See William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of “Unconstitutional” Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1906 (1993).
175
See id. (emphasis in original).
176
See id.
177
See Berns, supra note 26, at 1688; Alexander, supra note 26, at 406.
178
See supra text accompanying notes 152–155.
179
See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of
Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 854–56 (2014) (describing “intertemporal
statutory interpretation,” which considers “the context in which the statute was written”).
172
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the passage of time also implicates the doctrine of desuetude, which holds
that antiquated laws are no longer valid because they are no longer in use. 180
For these reasons, Treanor and Sperling would reject the writ-of-erasure
fallacy, particularly when revival of the affected statute would constrain
individual liberties.181 In these cases, “statutes that implicate individual
liberty interests should be enforced only if the current majority supports
them.”182 Their position builds on the work of Alexander Bickel, who argued
that current majoritarian support should govern the application of the law.183
Treanor and Sperling suggest that the argument against enforcement “is
strongest when the statute has long been unenforced because of a judicial
decision that held the statute unconstitutional.”184
Of course, every statute may be challenged upon adoption, and any statute
may be found unconstitutional at some future date. The problem with zombie
laws is that they have already been found unconstitutional. In these cases, the
political process should reset to the status quo ante—to the time before the
zombie law was adopted. This would provide legislatures the opportunity to
reaffirm their belief in the value of the law, thereby incurring both the
associated costs and benefits of political engagement.185 Apart from their
democratic illegitimacy, zombie laws generate other problems. If zombie
laws can be reactivated, they impose a significant burden on legislatures.
Every year, state legislatures would need to determine whether a statute had
been found unconstitutional and then adopt legislation formalizing that
outcome by excising the statute from the code.186 Such a process is inefficient
and certainly unnecessary.187
180

See Alexander, supra note 26, at 395–99; Erik Encarnación, Note, Desuetude-Based
Severability: A New Approach to Old Morals Legislation, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
149, 149 (2005); Mark Peter Henriques, Note, Desuetude and Declaratory Judgment: A
New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1990). But see Linda
Rodgers & William Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1966)
(rejecting desuetude as a defense).
181
See Treanor & Sperling, supra note 174, at 1955.
182
Id.
183
See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 60–62
(1961); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 30 (2003) (“[A]t least in some
circumstances, involving certain kinds of human interests, a criminal law cannot be
enforced if it has lost public support.”).
184
See Treanor & Sperling, supra note 174, at 1951.
185
See Brady, supra note 33, at 1083.
186
See Crawford, supra note 89, at 665.
187
See Wasserman, supra note 33, at 1074–75 (discussing legislative inertia); Treanor &
Sperling, supra note 174, at 1930. Some states have rescinded their abortion trigger laws.
See Pub. Act. 100-0538, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017) (overturning the 1975 Illinois
trigger law); see also Recent Legislation, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1836, 1836 (2018).
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Trigger laws are even more problematic because they are knowingly
adopted in violation of extant constitutional law. Such action would seem
counter to the oath of office that legislators take to “preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 188 Moreover,
accepting the legitimacy of trigger laws would incentivize legislatures to
adopt unconstitutional laws in the hope that future courts would eventually
activate them.189 They would be aided by what Guido Calabresi called the
“burden of inertia” in a country “choking on obsolete statutes.” 190 Such
“hyperlexis” has “toxic effects upon liberty,” constraining both personal and
economic liberty.191 When the Supreme Court holds that a statute is
unconstitutional, there is value in finality, even in a system that allows for
change.192
In the absence of a duly enacted law, there can be no crime and no
punishment. Nullum crimen sine lege is the consequence for violating the rule
of legality. It offers a simple yet forceful defense to prosecution under zombie
laws or trigger laws.
V. CONCLUSION
In Dobbs, the Supreme Court indicated that the authority to regulate or
prohibit abortion should be returned “to the people and their elected

188

See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 1; LA. CONST. art. 10 § 30 (1974) (“Every official shall take
the following oath or affirmation: ‘I, ..., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
the constitution and laws of the United States and the constitution and laws of this state . . .
.’”).
189
Trigger laws reflect an albeit weakened form of legislative entrenchment, which is seen
as contrary to democratic principles. See generally John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 1773 (2003) (arguing that legislative entrenchment poses significant
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representatives.”193 In fact, the Court repeated this specific phrase throughout
its opinion.194 Yet, state use of zombie laws and trigger laws to prohibit and
criminalize abortion is contrary to due process and the rule of law. Zombie
laws are void. Trigger laws are void ab initio.
If there are any doubts about the legitimacy of zombie laws or trigger laws,
states should be obligated to enact new legislation affirming the prohibition
on abortion.195 Given the profound consequences of these laws, such action
would be consistent with the Court’s stated desire to show deference “to the
people and their elected representatives.” 196
And yet, there is a final irony in the Court’s opinion. Returning the
difficult decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy “to the people” should
really mean returning it to the one person who is most directly affected by
this decision—the pregnant person.
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